

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Armed Forces Communications and  
Electronics Association  
Sheraton-Carlton House,  
Washington, D.C.  
Wednesday, 20 June 1979

I am indeed pleased to be with this particular association because there is such a close association between you and your industries and us in the intelligence community. The challenges facing you throughout your business life are very similar to those that beset the intelligence community today. I suggest that one of your first challenges is to adapt to the events in the world around us which are changing all the time. A second challenge you always face is to predict what science and technology will bring forth that you can make available to your customers. And a third challenge is to anticipate what those customers needs and demands are going to be in the years ahead. I admire the way in which you meet those three challenges. Let me describe how they are similar to our challenges in the intelligence business of our country.

First, we must adapt to a different perception that the United States has of its role in the world. Second, we must adapt to the greater sophistication in the techniques of collecting intelligence which you and others in related industries are making available to us. Third, we must adapt to a much different attitude of the public of this country that wants to know more about intelligence activities than ever before. I would like very quickly to discuss with you how we are trying to respond to these challenges.

First, let me look at the changing perception the United States has of its role in the world. We are, I believe, in a state of transition in public attitudes towards foreign affairs. We are moving away from an activist interventionist outlook to one which recognizes more clearly the limits on our ability to influence events in foreign countries. We are not becoming isolationists. Quite the contrary. We are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to intervening on the international scene and entering into a national view of the world which is much more reasoned and balanced. Clearly, the United States must continue to play a major role on the world scene. What is different perhaps is that in today's circumstances we must gauge more carefully what that role can and should be.

For instance, look at the difficulty today in simply deciding whom we are for and whom we are against in any international issue. Traditionally, we always were in favor of the fellow the Soviets were against. Today, things are not quite that simple. In the last year and a half there have been at least two international conflicts in which two communist nations were pitted against each other with the Soviets supporting one but not the other in each case. Neither was a likely candidate for our support.

Beyond that, today, it is not nearly so clear that the United States should take sides in every international issue even if the Soviets are pressing for an advantage. The consequences of any nations succumbing to communist influence is not as irreversible as perhaps we once thought. Look back on Indonesia, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia. All came under substantial communist influence and all have returned to independence. Now what this adds up to is not that we are impotent on the international scene, but that the leverage of our influence, while still considerable, must be exercised more subtly. We must be more concerned with long term influences rather than just putting a finger in the dike. And if we want to be able to anticipate rather than simply react to events, the intelligence community must be able to recognize and interpret the underlying themes and forces which we can expect to influence events over time. This means a vastly expanded scope of intelligence work.

Thirty years ago the primary focus in intelligence was on Soviet military activities. Today the threat to our national well-being comes not only from the Soviets and from the military. We must be equally concerned with politics, economics, food resources, population growth, narcotics, international terrorism and technology transfer to name just a few. These new areas of concern represent the expanding intercourse among nations in an increasingly interdependent world. Many of you may be involved in the questions of technology transfer. While I have listed it here as a new concern, the first recorded instance of technology transfer problems for our country was in 1622. Just south of here, near Jamestown, a new colony of 200 settlers was almost wiped out by an Indian tribe. The home company in England immediately dispatched a ship with new military equipment so the settlers could defend themselves against these Indians. They got body armor from the Tower of London, and some of the most sophisticated crossbows of that day. When they arrived near Jamestown they handed out the body armor although it was not much use against Indians. But when they looked at the crossbows they realized that to transfer to this continent the technology of a sophisticated crossbow was more than they could possibly risk. They took them all back to England. That is a true story. So technology transfer problems are nothing new today, though I would suggest today that poor handling of technology transfer can have a much greater impact on our country than in the days of crossbows.

There is not an academic discipline, not a geographical area of the world in which we in the intelligence community can afford not to be well-informed if we are going to serve policy makers well. Thus, this is a more demanding time perhaps than ever before for intelligence and it is a time of vast expansion of the subject matter with which we must be intimately concerned.

The second trend bringing change is the technological revolution in the way that we collect information. It is a revolution that I hardly need detail to this audience. Thanks to you, our national capabilities in the technical area--in overhead photography, in signals intercept--are unequalled in the world. Interestingly, however, rather than denigrating

the role of the human intelligence agent or the spy, these burgeoning capabilities in photography and signals intercept in fact heighten the importance of the human intelligence element. The more information that our technical systems provide to us the more questions are raised. Generally, a photograph or a signals intercept tells us something that happened in the past. The policy maker then asks why it happened and what may happen next. Discerning intentions, plans, incentives of foreign individuals or nations is the forte of the human intelligence agent.

Thus, today our challenge is not only to be able to absorb and utilize the vast quantities of technically collected information but also to be able to pull that effort together in an orchestrated, complementary manner so that we can acquire the information this country needs with minimum risk and cost.

Now I am sure this sounds logical and simple, but as you all well know, intelligence in our country is spread over a vast bureaucracy. It is lodged in many departments and agencies, each with its own priorities. We can no longer absorb and process this flow of intelligence efficiently if we adhere to traditional, compartmented, parochial ways of doing business. So, there has been some fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes. A year and a quarter ago President Carter signed a new Executive Order which gave to the Director of Central Intelligence new authority over the budgets of all national intelligence organizations and authority to direct the way in which they collect intelligence. The task of developing a true sense of teamwork among a myriad of agencies, bureaus, and organizations is still in the process of evolving. But, it is having a very substantial effect on the whole intelligence apparatus.

The third element driving change today is the increased public attention to intelligence activities ever since the investigations from 1974 to 1976. Those investigations brought to American intelligence more public attention than has ever before been brought to bear on a major intelligence organization. The impact could not help but be substantial and frankly, within the intelligence community, it has been traumatic. The right kind of attention can be beneficial both to us and to the American public. By the right kind I mean visibility which gives the public access to information about the general way we go about our business and why we are doing what we are doing, and which also confirms that the controls which have been established over the intelligence community are being exercised as was intended.

To achieve this right kind of visibility, the intelligence community is more open. We pass more of the information which we gain and produce to you, the American public, through unclassified publication of our studies than ever before. We look at every analysis or an estimate that we do and ask ourselves, if we take out that information which would reveal our sources and that information which gives our policy makers a special advantage in foreign policy, will the remaining substance support the conclusions we have come to and is the topic adequately

important to the public that we should publish more; yes, we do. In addition, we answer questions from the press more; we speak in public more, as I am privileged to tonight, we participate more in academic conferences and symposia. I know that the intelligence community is doing an honorable and a vital job for our country and it is doing it well. I personally want you to know as much about it as is compatible with our being able to continue to do that job well.

Still, some of the visibility that we have received in recent years is definitely unwanted. Unwanted because it benefits neither Americans nor our friends and allies. Here I am talking primarily about the unauthorized disclosure of information that has been properly classified. At the least, these disclosures have demoralized an intelligence service that has traditionally and of necessity operated largely in secrecy. Far more important is the destructive effect that such disclosures can and do have on our ability to do the job we are mandated to do by the President and the Congress. No foreign country or individual will entrust lives or sensitive information to us if they do not believe we can keep secrets. It is impossible to carry out the quest for information in a closed society like the Soviet Union, if what we do and how we do it ultimately becomes public knowledge. Improper revelations damage our country's long term ability to know what is going on in the many closed societies around the world.

Yet, let me hasten to add that in my view increased visibility is a net plus. We do need the American public's understanding and support. We must avoid possible abuses. Yet, at the same time we must recognize that with visibility there are also minuses. There are inhibitions on the actions we will take, on the risks that we can take. The issue before our country today is how do we balance our desire for privacy and propriety with the resulting reduction in intelligence capability and covert action potential.

Congress is expected to give expression to this issue of balance shortly. It will do so through the enactment of charters. Charters which set forth what we are authorized to undertake, establish the boundaries within which we must act, and create the oversight mechanism to check on our activities. It is my sincere hope that Congress will pass these charters during this present session. Written with care and sensitivity to the kinds of problems I have been discussing with you, charters could help to resolve some of these fundamental difficulties. Overreaction either by tying the intelligence community's hands or by creating no controls whatsoever would be a mistake. On the one hand, emasculating necessary intelligence capabilities, on the other, inviting abuse.

Let me assure you that in my view our nation's intelligence capabilities are strong and sound. The intelligence community is undergoing substantial change and that is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. Out of this present metamorphosis is emerging a new intelligence community. One in which the legal rights of our citizens and the controls and restrictions on intelligence activities

will be balanced with the necessity of gaining information essential to foreign policy. This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet. But, we are moving surely in the right direction. When we reach our goal, we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American model. One tailored to the laws and standards of our society. As we proceed toward this goal we need your understanding and support. For that reason I am grateful to have had this opportunity to be with you tonight. Thank you again for letting me be here and for all you do for us. God bless you.

IT IS A PLEASURE for me to be here with you this evening. I want to talk with you about the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community and to share with you my perceptions and some of my experiences since I became Director of Central Intelligence.

I must confess that when I was off in China, the whole intelligence community and the welter of charges and allegations about it seemed very remote and unreal to me. Many of you have heard and read so much conflicting information about intelligence that you must wonder just what it all means.

Let me say first that I have learned that the intelligence community is one of the biggest assets we have in defending America's security. The community itself is diverse, and its range of talents and capabilities is absolutely unique.

Many of you think of intelligence and perhaps think only of the CIA and James Bond spy adventures. Well, that is a tiny part of our business. Most of the Agency's work is the far less exciting but equally important task of gathering information, sifting facts and attempting to develop an accurate picture of events and trends abroad.

Others of you may think of intelligence only in connection with the excesses of the past. Indeed, there were some mistakes and some bad judgments, but there were also a lot of charges made that weren't true. The mistakes were rooted out and stopped by the intelligence community itself well before they were publicly revealed. And I can assure you that we are taking every possible precaution to ensure that such abuses never occur again.

I said that the intelligence community is truly a national asset. Let me give you an example of one of its activities that may be of particular interest to this group: technical intelligence collection.

The main mission of foreign intelligence is to produce quality intelligence for the use of our policymakers so that they can determine policies with the best possible information and judgment we can give them. (I should add we are not in the policy business.) Obviously, producing quality intelligence depends upon collecting quality intelligence to support and feed the analytical process.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the collection of this kind of information has been transformed. Human sources—spies, if you will—remain important and in many cases essential, but they are increasingly hard to come by. We had to find new ways to collect information to meet the needs of our increasingly technical problems.

In response to these needs, an activity known as technical collection has evolved. This has perhaps had

by The Honorable George Bush  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

its greatest impact on our ability to solve key military intelligence problems such as determining the characteristics and deployment of weapon systems—systems that are themselves based on advancing and sophisticated technology.

A most dramatic example of a system to emerge from harnessing technology to the ends of intelligence collection was the U-2 program. In the mid- and late '50s, the U-2 was a unique aircraft in terms of its performance, the camera systems it carried and the superb information it collected.

For many reasons, the U-2 is no longer a useful intelligence collector. But as the U-2 began to lose its effectiveness, other systems came along to fill the gap.

The new systems have dramatically expanded the capabilities and applications of technical intelligence collection. Today, technical intelligence collection systems represent a large portion of the total national intelligence resources.

Another part of this national asset is its wealth of highly educated and gifted analysts. Collecting quality information is not the end of the intelligence process. There is a great difference between information and intelligence.

If I may, I would like to cite an example that many of you in this room understand all too well: Pearl Harbor. In the days before the Second World War, the United States had what could be called departmental intelligence. In other words, each department and agency had bits and pieces of information that they carefully controlled. In today's terminology, no one was "getting it together."



"I believe that one of my principal tasks as Director of Central Intelligence is to restore the faith of the American people in their intelligence service. This we can do by operating fully within the guidelines established. We must not and will not violate the laws of this country."



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23 JUN 1978

The Honorable George Bush  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Bush:

On behalf of Mr. Thomas Campobasso, National President, the National Officers, the Directors and the members of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association I extend to you our deep appreciation for the address you gave at the Banquet of our 30th Annual Convention.

Your speech was not only interesting and entertaining but it was also topical, informative, patriotic and inspiring. I think you would like to know and should know that I have received and am still receiving numerous, unsolicited, highly complimentary comments from individuals who were in the audience. We will publish your speech in the next issue of Signal Magazine; therefore, your thoughts and views will reach the remainder of our world wide membership and will contribute to their understanding, education, faith in our Intelligence Agencies and respect and admiration for you as an individual and as a public servant.

Your presence and message were the major contribution to the success of our convention and we are most appreciative.

Sincerely,

  
George E. Pickett  
Lt. General, USA (Ret.)  
Executive Vice President

12 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to the D

FROM

: Angus MacLean Thuermer  
Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT

: Armed Forces Communication and Electronic  
Association Convention Banquet

Lt. General George Pickett, U.S.A. (retired) has invited the DCI to be the guest speaker at the Armed Forces Communication and Electronic Association 30th Anniversary Convention Banquet on June 9. This will be a black tie affair at the Sheraton Park Hotel. General Pickett anticipates an audience of anywhere from 1,000 to 1,200. Top people in the communications, computer, electronic, and command and control industries will be present at the convention.

General Pickett says that there are 250 corporation members of the Association. They are the top national security firms such as AT&T, Boeing, Westinghouse, E-Systems, Hughes, Martin-Marrietta, Western Electric, etc.

A gold medal for distinguished service is awarded each year to the guest speaker.

This looks like a good opportunity to get across a message. Gen. Pickett says the speech will be replayed in their journal. The DCI may recall we put together a small piece on intelligence for their journal in his name recently. I recommend that the DCI take this one on if he can.

General Pickett says Bill Baroody of the White House can talk to the DCI about this outfit if DCI wishes.

[redacted]  
Angus MacLean Thuermer

STAT

P.S. Mrs. Pickett (nee Jane Stanton) went to Rye Country Day School with the DCI, says the General.

2

General Pickett:

Private Line:

Regular Line:

STAT

REMARKS AT

ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS

AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION

BY

GEORGE BUSH

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 JUNE 1976

BANQUET SPEAKER  
ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONIC ASSOCIATION  
CONVENTION

Wednesday, June 9, 1976; 8:00 o'clock

7:05 p.m.	Depart Agency for Sheraton Park Hotel
7:30 p.m.	Arrive Sheraton Park -- Main Entrance
	Mr. Bush will be met by Mr. Bob Homer, C&P Telephone Co., <u>outside the Main Entrance</u>
7:30 p.m.	Attend VIP Reception
8:00 p.m.	Dinner

Attending with Mr. Bush:



25  
-- Table 25

Contact: Mary -- 387-5752

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DCI PUBLIC APPEARANCE

Event: Armed Forces Communication and Electronic Association Convention Banquet

Place: Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D. C.

Date: June 9, 1976

Time: 7:00 p.m. cocktails in the Dover Room -- 8:00 p.m. banquet speaker in the Sheraton Hall

Speaking from Text Yes        No       

Need Press Office Help to Prepare Text Yes ✓ No       

Hand Out Text NO

Limited Release NO

Embargoed Release NO

Want Press Office to Attend Yes ✓ No       

Press Conference Yes        No ✓

Need Press Office Help to Set Up Press Conference Yes        No ✓

Special Press Assistance Required some mention of computer - comm as important to Intelligence


Comments 15 minutes maximum -  
Theme: need for intelligence capability 2nd to none

Travel Arrangements "Black Tie"

were  
Picture and bio ~~have been~~ mailed to Lt. Gen. Pickett  
on May 17th.


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
May 28, 1976

*Public  
Affairs  
18 May 76*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM:  : Office of the Assistant to the Director  
SUBJECT: Background Information for your speech to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, June 9, 1976.

Attached is the information you requested dealing with the importance of technology to intelligence and on the role of communications in intelligence. This was largely written by Les Dirks, who could, of course, expand it should you wish more. Also attached is a copy of the statement you sent to Signal Magazine, which is sponsored by this Association. You might also wish to draw on that.

If you wish additional text or a more formal statement prepared, I will be happy to help.



STAT

*Pub Affs*  
(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY 76-2227/2)

### Technical Collection

The production of quality intelligence at all levels, most especially at the national level, depends on the collection of quality information to support and feed the analytical process. Over the past ten to fifteen years, the collection of this information has been transformed. The more traditional human sources of information on many of the most critical intelligence problems have been increasingly difficult to come by. Human sources remain important -- and in many areas are essential -- but new means of collecting information were required.

In response, an activity known as technical collection has evolved. That means using technology, frequently in the most sophisticated state-of-the-art forms, to collect and process essential data. Technical collection has had the greatest impact on key military intelligence problems, such as determining the characteristics, capabilities, and deployment of weapon systems, which themselves are based on advancing and sophisticated technology.

The first, and in many ways the most dramatic example of a system to emerge from the harnessing of technology to the ends of intelligence collection, was the U-2 program. In the mid and late 50's, the U-2 was a unique aircraft in terms of its performance, the camera systems it carried, and the information it collected. For many reasons, not the least of which is sophisticated air defense, the U-2 is no longer a useful platform.

But as the U-2 began to lose its effectiveness, other systems came along to fill the gap and dramatically to expand the capability and applications of technical intelligence collection. Each new initiative in this broad and tremendously important area has been driven by changing needs and advancing technology. In many cases unique technology was developed specifically to meet evolving intelligence requirements. Today technical collection systems represent a large portion of the total national intelligence resources both in terms of capabilities and dollars.

### Intelligence and Communications

Today the national intelligence program deals in large quantities of detailed information and data of all sorts. To handle immense quantities of information we need capable and dependable communications systems. Further, the U.S. intelligence establishment is a worldwide establishment. There are facilities and components in various parts of the world. They must be linked together and to Washington 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They must meet extreme challenges in terms of capacity and quality, and we must keep a sharp eye on efficiency and cost.

Over the years the unique communications needs of intelligence have been satisfied in many ways, from the simplest, most pedestrian means, such as conventional mails and telegraph networks, through the most sophisticated and specialized means technology can support. The CIA and other parts of the intelligence community have been pacesetters in improving U.S. government communications worldwide.

I am pleased and honored to contribute to this convention issue of SIGNAL magazine. In my first months as Director of Central Intelligence, I have come to realize how advancing technology has affected and will affect the way the Intelligence Community does its job.

Data flow and data management are two critical concerns of the Intelligence Community. It does not require an extensive technical background to realize the role that advances in computer technology can play in future intelligence production. Computer networking, mass memories, and rapid access to large data bases will offer new technology to all intelligence analysts. This new technology will improve analyst-to-analyst communication and will improve the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product.

There will be a need to assimilate these new data-handling techniques in the Intelligence Community as well as a need to apply an aggressive systems integration effort if we are to reap all the benefits of advanced data processing. I am sure that in the next decade all of these advances will significantly enhance the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. It will be one of management's important challenges to anticipate these advances and to ensure that the gains they promise are realized to the greatest extent.

REMARKS AT  
ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS  
AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION  
BY  
GEORGE BUSH  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
9 JUNE 1976

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE HERE WITH YOU THIS EVENING.

I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND TO SHARE WITH YOU MY PERCEPTIONS AND SOME OF MY EXPERIENCES SINCE I BECAME DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

I MUST CONFESS THAT WHEN I WAS OFF IN CHINA, THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE WELTER OF CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS ABOUT IT SEEMED VERY REMOTE AND UNREAL TO ME. MANY OF YOU HAVE HEARD AND READ SO MUCH CONFLICTING INFORMATION ABOUT INTELLIGENCE THAT YOU MUST WONDER JUST WHAT IT ALL MEANS.

LET ME SAY FIRST OFF, THAT I HAVE LEARNED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST ASSETS WE HAVE IN DEFENDING AMERICA'S SECURITY. THE COMMUNITY ITSELF IS DIVERSE, AND ITS RANGE OF TALENTS AND CAPABILITIES IS ABSOLUTELY UNIQUE.

MANY OF YOU THINK OF INTELLIGENCE AND PERHAPS THINK ONLY OF THE CIA AND JAMES BOND SPY ADVENTURES. WELL, THAT IS A TINY PART OF OUR BUSINESS. MOST OF THE AGENCY'S WORK IS THE FAR LESS EXCITING, BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT, TASK OF GATHERING INFORMATION, SIFTING FACTS, AND ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS AND TRENDS ABROAD.

OTHERS OF YOU MAY THINK OF INTELLIGENCE ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXCESSES OF THE PAST. INDEED, THERE WERE SOME MISTAKES AND SOME BAD JUDGMENTS, BUT THERE WERE ALSO A LOT OF CHARGES MADE THAT WEREN'T TRUE. THE MISTAKES WERE ROOTED OUT AND STOPPED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ITSELF WELL BEFORE THEY WERE PUBLICLY REVEALED. AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE TAKING EVERY POSSIBLE PRECAUTION TO ENSURE THAT SUCH ABUSES NEVER OCCUR AGAIN.

I SAID THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS TRULY A NATIONAL ASSET. LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE OF ONE OF ITS ACTIVITIES THAT MAY BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THIS GROUP--TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

THE MAIN MISSION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IS TO PRODUCE  
QUALITY INTELLIGENCE FOR THE USE OF OUR POLICY-MAKERS SO THAT  
THEY CAN DETERMINE POLICIES WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE INFORMATION  
AND JUDGMENT WE CAN GIVE THEM. (I SHOULD ADD WE ARE NOT IN THE  
POLICY BUSINESS.) OBVIOUSLY, PRODUCING QUALITY INTELLIGENCE  
DEPENDS UPON COLLECTING QUALITY INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT AND FEED  
THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS.

OVER THE PAST TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS, THE COLLECTION OF THIS  
KIND OF INFORMATION HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED. HUMAN SOURCES--SPIES,  
IF YOU WILL--REMAIN IMPORTANT--AND IN MANY CASES ESSENTIAL, BUT  
THEY ARE INCREASINGLY HARD TO COME BY. WE HAD TO FIND NEW WAYS  
TO COLLECT INFORMATION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF OUR INCREASINGLY  
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS.

IN RESPONSE TO THESE NEEDS, AN ACTIVITY KNOWN AS TECHNICAL  
COLLECTION HAS EVOLVED. THIS HAS PERHAPS HAD ITS GREATEST IMPACT  
ON OUR ABILITY TO SOLVE KEY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS -- SUCH AS

DETERMINING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS...  
SYSTEMS THAT ARE THEMSELVES BASED ON ADVANCING AND SOPHISTICATED  
TECHNOLOGY.

A MOST DRAMATIC EXAMPLE OF A SYSTEM TO EMERGE FROM HARNESSING  
TECHNOLOGY TO THE ENDS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, WAS THE U-2 PROGRAM.  
IN THE MID AND LATE 50s, THE U-2 WAS A UNIQUE AIRCRAFT IN TERMS OF  
ITS PERFORMANCE, THE CAMERA SYSTEMS IT CARRIED, AND THE SUPERB  
INFORMATION IT COLLECTED.

FOR MANY REASONS, THE U-2 IS NO LONGER A USEFUL INTELLIGENCE  
COLLECTOR. BUT AS THE U-2 BEGAN TO LOSE ITS EFFECTIVENESS, OTHER  
SYSTEMS CAME ALONG TO FILL THE GAP.

THE NEW SYSTEMS HAVE DRAMATICALLY EXPANDED THE CAPABILITIES  
AND APPLICATIONS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. TODAY,  
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS REPRESENT A LARGE PORTION  
OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES.

ANOTHER PART OF THIS NATIONAL ASSET IS ITS WEALTH OF HIGHLY  
EDUCATED AND GIFTED ANALYSTS. COLLECTING QUALITY INFORMATION IS

NOT THE END OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. THERE IS A GREAT  
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE.

IF I MAY CITE AN EXAMPLE THAT MANY OF YOU IN THIS ROOM  
UNDERSTAND ALL TOO WELL...PEARL HARBOR. IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE  
SECOND WORLD WAR, THE UNITED STATES HAD WHAT COULD BE CALLED  
DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, EACH DEPARTMENT AND  
AGENCY HAD BITS AND PIECES OF INFORMATION THAT THEY CAREFULLY  
CONTROLLED. IN TODAY'S TERMINOLOGY, NO ONE WAS "GETTING IT  
TOGETHER." ALL OF THE INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HAVE LED AN ANALYST  
TO CONCLUDE THAT THE JAPANESE INTENDED TO ATTACK PEARL HARBOR WAS  
AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON. BUT IT WAS NOT IN ONE PLACE FOR AN  
ANALYST TO STUDY: IT WAS SCATTERED ALL OVER TOWN...AND THEREFORE  
IT WAS USELESS. THAT WAS INFORMATION -- NOT INTELLIGENCE. TODAY,  
AS DCI, I HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GETTING IT ALL TOGETHER. IT'S  
WORKING.

INTELLIGENCE IS THE RESULT OF PATIENT, PAINSTAKING WORK BY  
ANALYSTS THROUGHOUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. LET ME GIVE YOU

A STATISTIC THAT I THINK AMPLY DEMONSTRATES THE KIND OF TRAINING  
AND BACKGROUND OUR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES HAVE: BETWEEN 1971  
AND 1975, 51 PERCENT OF ENTERING CIA PROFESSIONALS HAD BACHELOR'S  
DEGREES, 34 PERCENT HELD MASTER'S, AND ALMOST 10 PERCENT HAD PhD'S....

THESE GIFTED PROFESSIONALS HAVE ACHIEVED SUCCESS AFTER SUCCESS:

-- AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SPOTTED THE SOVIET NUCLEAR

MISSILES BEING DELIVERED TO CUBA IN 1962 AND SUPPORTED

THE PRESIDENT AS HE WORKED THROUGH 13 NIGHTMARISH DAYS

TO FORCE THEIR REMOVAL;

-- AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE GAVE SEVEN YEARS WARNING OF

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOSCOW ANTI-BALLASTIC MISSILE SYSTEM;

-- AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE PINPOINTED EIGHT NEW SOVIET INTER-

CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND EVALUATED THE DEVELOPMENT

OF EACH THREE OR MORE YEARS BEFORE IT BECAME OPERATIONAL;

-- TWO MAJOR NEW SOVIET SUBMARINE PROGRAMS WERE ANTICIPATED

WELL BEFORE THE FIRST BOATS SLID DOWN THE WAYS;

-- AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE HAS CREATED A COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE NEED FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION FOR SOME KINDS OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED WITH THE USSR. THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OF 1972 WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THESE "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION" AND THE RELEVANT ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY.

I AM PROUD OF THIS RECORD AND THE PEOPLE THAT COMPILED IT -- AND YOU SHOULD BE, TOO.

THE DEDICATION OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CIA AND IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE IS REMARKABLE. AS YOU PROBABLY ALSO KNOW, SOME INDIVIDUALS BOTH HERE AND ABROAD HAVE RECKLESSLY PUBLISHED THE NAMES OF HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE WHOM THEY CLAIM ARE CIA EMPLOYEES. DESPITE THE THREATS, THE HAZARDS, AND THE DANGERS -- NOT ONE AGENCY EMPLOYEE HAS ASKED TO BE SENT HOME. THAT IS THE KIND OF DEDICATION I AM TALKING ABOUT.

LET ME CONCLUDE BY GIVING YOU A BRIEF LOOK AT WHERE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOW STANDS.

EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO INTELLIGENCE, BY BOTH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS, HAVE COME TO AN END. THE PRESIDENT HAS ISSUED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER CLEARLY SETTING FORTH GUIDELINES SPECIFYING WHAT AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE CAN AND CANNOT DO. WE ARE FOLLOWING THOSE GUIDELINES TO THE LETTER.

THE CONGRESS HAS ESTABLISHED A NEW OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IN THE SENATE. SENATOR INOUE IS CHAIRMAN AND SENATOR BAKER IS VICE-CHAIRMAN. WE INTEND TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THAT COMMITTEE AND THE OTHER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES THAT HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED TO OVERSEE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN TURN, I HAVE URGED EACH COMMITTEE TO SAFEGUARD THE SECRET INFORMATION THAT WE PRESENT TO THEM.

I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF MY PRINCIPAL TASKS AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS TO RESTORE THE FAITH OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THIS WE CAN DO BY OPERATING FULLY WITHIN THE

GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED. WE MUST NOT AND WILL NOT VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THIS COUNTRY.

BUT WE CANNOT RUN AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN A GLASS BOWL. I AM CHARGED UNDER THE LAW WITH PROTECTING OUR SOURCES AND METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE. I WILL HONOR THAT CHARGE. I AM SICK AND TIRED OF LEAKS FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, AND I WILL DO MY LEVEL BEST TO GUARD AGAINST THEM.

WE MUST NOT HIDE BEHIND A CLOAK OF SECRECY. I AM TAKING STEPS TO END THE OVERCLASSIFICATION THAT HAS PLAGUED THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO KNOW THAT WHEN WE SAY SOMETHING IS SECRET, IT REALLY IS A SECRET WORTHY OF PROTECTION.

AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE IS GOOD. WE ARE WORKING HARD TO MAKE IT EVEN BETTER...AND YOUR SUPPORT IS IMPORTANT TO US.

THANK YOU.

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UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
Executive Registry 76-2227/1			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	
1	DCI		
2	(J.F.)		
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6	A/DCI 1F04		
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
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
EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

*Pub. Affs.*

J.F.  
General Pickett  
and all those electronic  
guys?

Understand DCI  
going to speak.

Can you slip  
us the events  
form when you  
have a minute? Thanks



STAT

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
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TO	DATE	INITIALS	
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Remarks:			
<p>J.F. = This is a good one, I think. Hope DCI can do. Will get more Scheduling details for you if he'll be able to do.</p>			
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